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Chapter Three

Moral Philosophy and Moral Cultivation
WilliamJ. Prior

The Insufficiency of Moral Philosophy for Moral Cultivation
Moral cultivation is a practice, any practice, by which one attempts to direct the
course of moral development either of oneself or others. The aim of this practice
is the attainment of moral wisdom, or the closest approximation to that ideal that
human beings can attain. In the ancient Greek tradition of philosophy, as well as
in the Chinese tradition, the name often given to one who has attained moral
wisdom is "the sage." Writers in the ancient Greek tradition, with which I shall
be concerned here, attempt to show that the life of the sage is one that we all
have reason to strive to attain, because that life is, of all lives possible for human
beings, uniquely, or especially, or most nearly happy. The cultivation of moral
wisdom is thus part and parcel of the pursuit of happiness (eudaimonia).
The question I wish to discuss in this essay is whether the study of moral
philosophy is sufficient for the attainment of moral wisdom. I shall argue that it
is not. This may seem an unsurprising conclusion, hardly worth arguing for. Yet
in contemporary higher education we approach the teaching of ethics as if the
study of moral philosophy were, if not sufficient for the acquisition of moral
wisdom, at least the only tool available to us. Even some of the ancient Greek
moral philosophers, who I shall argue showed both by their theory and practice
that they knew better than this, made very strong claims on behalf of the study
of moral philosophy. Socrates, at least as Plato portrays him, seems to regard the
acquisition of theoretical knowledge of the nature of the virtues as both necessary and sufficient for the possession of virtue.
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The main argument of this paper will be that this view is incorrect. Even the
specifically cognitive aspect of moral development requires more than the acquisition of theoretical principles of moral philosophy. It requires as well the
development of the ability to discern the moral features of specific situations and
the related ability to discern the appropriate course of action to take to address
those features. The development of these abilities, which are essential to moral
wisdom, is an indispensable part of moral cultivation.

Intellectualism
I do not deny that the study of moral philosophy is a valuable means for understanding what is involved in moral cultivation. I do not deny that the ethical
works of the ancient Greek philosophers contain many valuable insights into the
nature of moral wisdom. I do not deny that one might be inspired by the reading
of these works to embark on a program of moral cultivation. This was the effect,
or one of the effects, their authors hoped for them. I deny, however, that these
works can provide, in themselves, an adequate guide to one seeking moral enlightenment. No such guide is possible; there is no set of general principles, philosophical or otherwise, the learning of which can constitute moral wisdom.
Moral wisdom is not reducible to such a set of rules. The development of moral
wisdom is not exclusively, and I think not even primarily, a matter of the internalization of principles. It is more like the development of a skill. The error of
thinking that the development of moral wisdom is primarily or exclusively a
matter of theoretical understanding I shall call "intellectualism." I shall try to
show, by adverting to certain examples from ancient Greek philosophy, why I
think intellectualism is mistaken. This has, or should have, rather large implications for the way in which ethics should be taught.
One ancient philosopher, Aristotle, makes the case explicitly for the insufficiency of moral philosophy, construed as the inculcation of abstract moral principles, for moral cultivation. The argument I shall make in this paper owes a
great deal to Aristotle's position. 1 It is not clear to me to what extent other ancient philosophers recognized this point in theory. They may have recognized it,
however, in practice, and in a couple of different ways. One of these ways involves the use of examples of the sage in their works (and here I have in mind in
particular Plato's portrait of Socrates, which I shall discuss below). Another involves the nature of moral education in ancient philosophical schools.

The Teaching of Ethics in Contemporary and Ancient Higher
Education
The teaching of ethics in contemporary American colleges and universities is
predominately intellectualistic. Students are introduced to the rudiments of
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moral theories-utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, virtue ethics, and the likein a way that is intended to be normatively neutral, with no attempt made to get
them to make one of these theories their own. They may be asked to apply these
competing theories to certain moral problems, but the practice here is purely intellectual and the intended outcome is understanding, not moral growth.
This practice is defended on the ground that intellectual understanding is the
only legitimate goal of classroom instruction, or is all that can be achieved in the
classroom. Sometimes the practitioners of this approach to ethics argue that it
does lead to the moral improvement of students, but the connection between developing an ability to argue about the application of various moral theories and
moral transformation is tenuous, to say the least. All who have taught moral philosophy in this way are familiar with the student who has mastered the material
of the course and yet remains to all intents and purposes unaffected by them.
In the classrooms of the ancient Greek philosophical schools there was no
pretense to neutrality. If one went to study with a Stoic or an Epicurean philosopher, one did so with the intention that the principles of Stoic or Epicurean philosophy would become ingrained in one's character. As Pierre Hadot has argued, philosophy was understood by the ancients as a way of life.2 The promise
made by the teachers of these schools was, "Come here for instruction and you
will attain wisdom." In order for this promise to be realized, both student and
teacher understood, the student had not merely to come to an understanding of
the principles of the school; he or she had to adopt and internalize them.
It may be that the philosophers who taught in these schools thought that the
inculcation of moral principles was sufficient for the acquisition of moral wisdom. In that case, they would be intellectualists, though intellectualists of a different sort than those described above with regard to contemporary American
higher education. Some of the works of these schools, such as the Principal
Doctrines of Epicurean ism, read like intellectualist tracts. But it also may be that
one purpose of teaching principles of moral philosophy in schools was so that
the students could benefit from the personal example of a teacher who, if he was
not a sage, was nevertheless advanced in moral wisdom. The ethical treatises of
these schools, which we read as intellectualist tracts, may have served a different
purpose in them. They may have supplemented, rather than replaced, the kind of
personal instruction I shall describe below. If that is the case, then the ancient
approach to the cultivation of moral wisdom would have been Aristotelian in
practice, if not always explicitly so in theory.

The Role of Principles in Moral Education
When I argue that the inculcation of principles is insufficient for the cultivation
of moral wisdom, I do not mean to deny that principles have a valuable, indeed
an indispensable role, in ethics. There is a part of ethics in which the inculcation
of principle is virtually everything. In this part of ethics, the right thing to do can
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be summarized in a simple prescription or prohibition: "Tell the truth," "Don't
lie." A minimal amount of interpretive skill is needed to apply such principles in
particular situations, but they are, as moral principles go, fairly self-explanatory.
There are more general principles, such as "Respect humanity," and "Love your
neighbor as yourself," that require more by way of interpretation, but the principles themselves are of primary importance.
I consider these principles to be the "elementary school" portion of moral
development. They are what one must know, what one must have adopted and
internalized, even to be admitted to the more advanced levels of moral cultivation. I do not wish to deny that there can be very sophisticated moral theories
developed to justify these moral principles. I only deny that the learning of these
theories is an essential element in moral cultivation. Consider the remark of
Epictetus, critical of even the ancient practice of moral education:
The first and most necessary department of philosophy deals with the application of moral principles; for instance, "not to lie." The second deals with demonstrations; for instance, "How comes it that one ought to lie?" The third is
concerned with establishing and analyzing these processes; for instance, "How
comes it that this is a demonstration? What is demonstration, what is consequence, what contradiction,what is true, what is false?" It follows then that the
third department is necessary because of the second, and the second becauseof
the first. The first is the most necessary part, and that in which we must rest.
But we reverse the order: we occupy ourselves with the third, and make that
our whole concern, and the first we completely neglect. Wherefore we lie, but
are ready enough with the demonstrationthat lying is wrong. (Manual,S2; P.
E. Matheson,trans.)

The Inculcation of Principles vs. the Development of Judgment
It does not matter for the purposes of my argument whether we treat these principles as the first stage of moral education or as a propaideutic to it. I do not
wish to deny that these principles have a valid place; the later stages of moral
cultivation, however, do not much resemble this initial stage of the inculcation
and internalization of principle.
This is a point that was recognized by Kant. 3 In the Groundwork Kant distinguished between moral principles, which were derivable from the categorical
imperative, formulable in propositions and could be applied without much difficulty, and what he called "counsels of prudence." Kant doesn't say this explicitly, but he must have thought that ancient Greek moral philosophy consisted
primarily of such counsels. These counsels were concerned with happiness; but
happiness, Kant thought, was far too vague a goal to yield universal principles.
Instead, he noted, it yielded maxims that were at best rules of thumb:
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the concept of happiness is so indetenninate a concept that although every man
wants to attain happiness, he never can say definitely and in unison with himself what it is that he really wants and wills. The reason for this is that all the
elements which belong to the concept of happiness are without exception empirical-that is, that they must be borrowed from experience; but that none the
less there is required for the Idea of happiness an absolute whole, a maximum
of well-being in my present, and in every future, state. Now it is impossible for
the most intelligent, and at the same time most powerful, but nevertheless finite, being to fonn here a detenninate concept of what he really wills. ls it
riches that he wants? How much anxiety, envy, and pestering might he not
bring in this way on his own head! Is it knowledge and insight? This might
perhaps merely give him an eye so sharp that it would make evils at present
hidden from him and yet unavoidable seem all the more frightful, or would add
a load of still further needs to the desires which already give him trouble
enough. Is it long life? Who will guarantee that it would not be a long misery?
Is it at least health? How often has infinnity of body kept a man from excesses
into which perfect health would have let him fall!-and so on. In short, he has
no principle by which he is able to decide with complete certainty what will
make him truly happy, since for this he would require omniscience. Thus we
cannot act on detenninate principles in order to be happy, but only on empirical
counsels, for example, of diet, frugality, politeness, reserve, and so on-things
which experience shows contribute most to well-being on the average. From
this it follows that imperatives of prudence, speaking strictly, do not command
at all-that is, cannot exhibit actions objectively as practically necessary; that
they are rather to be taken as recommendations (consilia), than as commands
(praecepta), of reason; that the problem of detennining certainly and universally what action will promote the happiness of a rational being is completely
insoluble; and consequently that in regard to this there is no imperative possible
which in the strictest sense could command us to do what will make us happy,
since happiness is an Ideal, not of reason, but of imagination-an Ideal resting
merely on empirical grounds, of which it is vain to expect that they should detennine an action by which we could attain the totality of a series of consequences which is in fact infinite.4
For this reason Kant, at least in the Groundwork, dismissed the part of ethics that was concerned with human happiness. (The conception of happiness that
Kant makes use of, a conception that defines happiness in terms of the satisfaction of desire or inclination, is quite different from the ancient conception of
human flourishing or eudaimonia.) When he attempts to apply his theoretical
understanding of moral principle to the subject matter of ancient ethics, in The
Doctrine of Virtue, the results are, to my mind, unsatisfactory. Though Kant is
wrong to dismiss the discussion of happiness, or to relegate it to a secondary
role, he is right to think that it differs in a fundamental way from the discussion
of moral principle.
Aristotle also recognizes in a way the difference between the part of ethics
that is concerned with principles and the part that is concerned with the cultivation of eudaimonia. In Nicomachean Ethics 11.6, after defining moral virtue in
terms of a mean between two vices, he writes:
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Not every action nor every emotion admits of a mean. There are some actions
and emotions whose very names connote baseness, e.g. spite, shamelessness,
envy; and among actions, adultery, theft, and murder. These and similar emotions and actions imply by their very names that they are bad; it is not their excess or deficiency which is called bad. It is, therefore, impossible ever to do
right in performing them: to perform them is always to do wrong. In cases of
this sort, let us say adultery, rightness and wrongness do not depend on committing it with the right woman at the right time and in the right manner, but the
mere fact of committing such action at all is to do wrong. (I 107a8-17; Martin
Ostwald, trans.)

Aristotle here makes a distinction similar to that made by Kant between a
part of ethics that is concerned with exceptionless principles and a part concerned with measure and proportion. Unlike Kant, he has no theoretical account
of what makes those actions wrong that are always, without exception, wrong.
This is almost the only passage in the Ethics in which he considers such actions.
He agrees, with Kant, however, on the distinction between the two parts of ethics, and on the fact that the part that is concerned with happiness cannot be reduced to a set of exceptionless principles.

The Wisdom of the Sage: Knowing What Is Valuable
The ancients saw the acquisition of moral wisdom as a process whereby the student is gradually transformed into the sage, or someone like the sage. Part of
what this involves is coming to know what the sage knows. What is it that
makes the sage wise, if not moral principles alone? Part of the answer to this
question lies in the fact that the sage knows what things in life are most valuable. The following paragraph from Philippa Foot's essay, "Virtues and Vices,"
illustrates this point:
One of the things a wise man knows and a foolish man does not is that such
things as social position, and wealth, and the good opinion of the world, are too
dearly bought at the cost of health or friendship or family ties. So we may say
that a man who lacks wisdom "has false values," and that vices such as vanity
and worldliness and avarice are contrary to wisdom in a special way. There is
always an element of false judgement about these vices, since the man who is
vain for instance sees admiration as more important than it is, while the worldly
man is apt to see the good life as one of wealth and power.5
Foot claims to find this part of moral wisdom "curiously elusive"; she says,
"I have never seen, or been able to,think out, a true account of this matter." 6 In
contrast with Foot, I think this aspect of moral wisdom fairly straightforward. It
is true, as she says, that "most men waste a lot of their lives in ardent pursuit of
what is trivial and unimportant," 7 and it is tempting to infer that many who do so
fail to recognize certain truths that the sage recognizes. But the truths them-
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selves are simple and easy to formulate, as Foot's own remarks show. Money
doesn't buy happiness. It profiteth not a man if he gain the entire world, and lose
his soul. One ought not to sacrifice friends or family for worldly success. Such
statements, I think, would be accepted in the abstract by most people, even those
whose lives seem to us to be at odds with them. This makes one wonder whether
those people who spend their lives, or large parts of them, in ardent pursuit of
the trivial have failed to understand the abstract point or have rather failed to
make that point a practical, operational part of their lives. Though they would
assent to the claims of the sage about what is of greatest value, their lives betray
what I shall call a lack of practical, as opposed to abstract or theoretical, comprehension.
The life of the sage seems different from the life of the ordinary person.
Take, as an obvious example from the Greek tradition, Socrates. Socrates neglected the practical pursuits of wealth and political power popular among his
fellow Athenians in favor of the pursuit of philosophical, and specifically ethical, wisdom. This pursuit was, by his own admission, and by his own criteria,
spectacularly unsuccessful: he claimed that he had attained no moral wisdom at
all beyond the awareness of the extent of his own ignorance. (Yet Socrates was
the least controversial example of a philosopher who lived the life of a sage in
ancient Greek philosophy. Even members of schools such as the Stoics that were
rivals to the Platonic school saw Socrates as a sage, perhaps as the only sage.
Later in the paper J shall attempt to explain why Socrates' wisdom could be seen
as distinct from any particular set of philosophical moral principles.) Plato in the
dialogues shows Socrates in conversation with a number of people who reject
this pursuit of philosophical wisdom as the pathway to happiness: Callicles and
Thrasymachus are examples that spring to mind. Most of Socrates' interlocutors,
however, don't raise questions about the value of philosophical wisdom; they
just seem unable to incorporate this pursuit, whose value they don't question,
within their lives. Alcibiades, who speaks more eloquently about the allure of
Socrates than any other character in the dialogues also describes the practical
conflict between the attractions of the philosophical life and the (theoretically
inferior but, for him, practically more insistent) attractions of political power (cf.
Symposium 2 I 5a-222a).
One part of the wisdom of the sage, then, is a recognition that is more
than theoretical of the relative value of various goods. We might say that the life
of the sage shows a level of practical commitment to certain goods, goods that
we find of central importance to living the good life. The fact that people whose
lives are characterized by "ardent pursuit of what is trivial and unimportant"
may nonetheless find the sage an admirable figure without being able to emulate
him or her very closely indicates that one may possess a certain amount of abstract theoretical appreciation of certain goods but be unable to live in accordance with that appreciation. This is probably the way life is for most of us,
most of the time, or so I suspect. We might wish we were more like Socrates, or
Jesus, or Gandhi, but wishing doesn't take us very far.
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The Wisdom of the Sage: Knowing What to Do
Still, this part of the wisdom of the sage is, as I have indicated, relatively easy to
formulate and to understand, if not to exemplify. The difficult part of the wisdom of the sage, in my view, is his or her ability to put this understanding of
what is valuable into concrete action. This part I shall call the practical wisdom
of the sage. Practical wisdom is the ability to find the right or best thing to do in
each and every concrete situation, or at least to do so a high percentage of the
time. Human judgment being inherently fallible, and practical matters being inherently uncertain, the ideal of an error-free life seems to be just that, an ideal. If
we are not to assert that it is impossible for anyone at all to become a sage, we
must describe a sage as one who comes closer to this ideal than others, not as
one who achieves it perfectly over the course of an entire life.
Why is the practical attainment of right action so difficult to understand? As
I have indicated up to this point, it is because the reasoning of the sage is not reducible to universal principles that can be clearly stated and transmitted to another. That is not to say that the sage may be unable to formulate such principles. When Aristotle defines virtue as the mean between two extremes he states
that this mean is "defined by a rational principle" (E. N. 11.6,l 107al). This principle, however, is not a universal one, applicable to all persons in all situations.
It is specific to the person and the situation involved. In contrast with universal
principles such as the wrongness of lying, the practical principles of virtuous
conduct are concerned with finding the right amount or degree in relation to the
right person at the right time:
We can experiencefear, confidence,desire,anger,pity and generallyany kind
of pleasureand pain eithertoo muchor too little,and in either case not properly.But to experienceall this at the righttime,towardthe rightobjects,toward
the right people,for the right reason,and in the right manner-that is the median and the best course,the coursethat is the markof virtue.(II.6, l 106bl823)

Aristotle famously regards virtue as a mean, but the mean is not an arithmetic one:
By the medianrelativeto us I understandan amountneithertoo large nor too
small,and this is neitherone nor the samefor everybody.To take an example:
if ten is manyand two is few,six is takenas the medianin relationto the entity,
for it exceedsand is exceededby the same amount,and is thus the medianin
termsof arithmeticproportion.But the medianrelativeto us cannot be determinedin this manner:if ten poundsof food is much for a man to eat and two
pounds little,it does not followthat the trainer will prescribesix pounds,for
this in turn may be much or little for him to eat; it may be little for Milo and
muchfor someonewhohasjust begunto take up athletics.(11.6,1106a3l-b4)
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A rule or principle that applies in one situation or in regard to one person
may not apply in another. Aristotle brings this out by means of several examples. I shall mention only two: one that is concerned with the situation, and one
that is concerned with the person. Considering the issue of voluntariness in action, Aristotle make use of the example of cargo jettisoned in a storm "Considering the action itself, nobody would throw away property," he writes; "but when
it is a matter of saving one's own life and that of his fellow passengers, any sensible man would do so." (III.I, 1l !Oa9-l l) One might object that this action can
be brought under a general rule, such as the following: "When faced with loss of
life at sea, which can be prevented by jettisoning cargo, then jettison cargo."
Such a rule is of little help in practice, however, for it does not tell us what situations are life-threatening. The practically wise individual is the one who neither
throws away the cargo unnecessarily, nor holds onto it to his or her own misfortune, but who does what the circumstances require.
Consider now the matter of individual differences. As Aristotle acknowledges, people are differently endowed by nature with the basis for the virtues
(VI.13, l 144b34-45al),just as we are have different physical endowments. One
of the ways in which we differ is in our susceptibility to temptations, the matters
in which we feel pleasure and pain. As Aristotle notes (11.3),pleasure and pain
are closely connected to virtue. Still, our susceptibilities in these matters may
differ. Alcohol may have for you a strong allure, and leave me cold; I may, in
contrast, be easily tempted by food, which has little attraction for you. Part of
what is involved in the development of virtue, then, is the identification and
regulation of those temptations that are particularly troublesome for us individually:
We must watch the errors which have the greatestattractionfor us personally.
For the naturalinclinationof one man differsfromthat of another,and we each
come to recognizeour own by observingthe pleasureand pain producedin us
[by differentextremes].We must then draw ourselvesaway in the oppositedirection,for by pulling away from error we shall reach the middle,as men do
when they straightenwarpedtimber. In every case we must be especiallyon
our guard againstpleasureand what is pleasant,for when it comesto pleasure
we cannotact as unbiasedjudges.(Il.9, I 109bl-9)
It is because of the variability in our natural temperament as well as in the
situations we face that we are unable to define virtuous activity in terms of abstract, universal principles alone:
Any discussionon mattersof action cannot be more than an outline and is
boundto lackprecision;for as we statedat the outset,one can demandof a discussion only what the subject matter pennits, and there are no fixed data in
mattersconcerningaction and questionsof what is beneficial,any more than
there are in mattersof health.And if this is true of our generaldiscussion,our
treatmentof particularproblemswill be even less precise,since these do not
come under the head of any art which can be transmittedby precept, but the
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agent must consider on each different occasion what the situation demands,
just as in medicine and in navigation. (11.2,I 104al-lO; italics added)

Perception
If Aristotle's description of the process of moral decision-making is correct, no
knowledge of universal principles by itself will lead us to act ethically. We require, in addition, both self-knowledge, knowledge of our own strengths and
weaknesses, and knowledge of the particular situation. How is such knowledge
attained? Aristotle has a short answer to this question: by perception. Consider
this remark:
[I]t is not easy to determine in what manner, with what person, on what occasion, and for how long a time one ought to be angry.... However, we do not
blame a man for slightly deviating from the course of goodness, whether he
strays toward excess or toward deficiency, but we do blame him if his deviation
is great and cannot pass unnoticed. It is not easy to determine by a formula at
what point and for how great a divergence a man deserves blame; but this difficulty is, after all, true of all objects of sense perception: determinations of this
kind depend upon particular circumstances and the decision rests with our
[moral] sense. (II.9, I 109bl4-23)
The word that Ostwald translates "[moral] sense" is aesthesis, normally
translated "perception." In the passage above Aristotle links this kind of aesthesis with sense perception, but later he distinguishes them:
[P]ractical wisdom has as its object the ultimate particular fact, of which there
is perception but no scientific knowledge. This perception is not the kind with
which [each of our five senses apprehends) its proper object, but the kind with
which we perceive that in mathematics the triangle is the ultimate figure. For in
this direction, too, we shall have to reach a stop. (Vl.8, 1142a 25-29)
The comparison with mathematical knowledge is worth considering. If
Ostwald is correct, 8 Aristotle is talking about the ability to "see" that a geometrical figure can be resolved into a number of triangles. This is a form of intuition. It is not the same as the insight into basic principles that Aristotle calls
nous, and which he discusses elsewhere in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics
(chiefly in Chapter 6). What it has in common with nous, however, and for that
matter with practical wisdom, is that it is a grasp of something ultimate from an
explanatory point of view. (That is why we "reach a stop" when we grasp it.)
We may remember being puzzled when studying geometry in school by some
construction or other, and suddenly "seeing" the solution. (The phenomenon is
the one that produces the conviction, "Now I can go on," as Wittgenstein notes.)
We might contrast this quasi-visual experience with performing the same construction in accordance with a set of instructions ("Given a line AB, first bisect
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it, then construct a line CD perpendicular to AB from the midpoint of AB." And
so on.) According to Aristotle, the perception involved in practical wisdom is
similar in nature. One may be puzzled by a practical problem, then suddenly
perceive the solution to it, and be able to "go on" by performing the appropriate
action. Of course, not every solution reached by practical reason is preceded by
puzzlement, nor is every problem equally difficult. In some cases the solution is
obvious at once. In others, it eludes the deliberative faculty of the wisest people
after prolonged consideration. Still, there are cases of the sort Aristotle describes: the sage "sees" the right thing to do in the situation at hand. The mental
phenomenon is akin to a gestalt shift; it is what Wittgenstein refers to as the
dawning of an aspect. What distinguishes the sage from ordinary people is that
the sage has these moments of insight more regularly than others, and that the
discernment is more often genuine rather than spurious.
What is the nature of this perceptual ability? Aristotle does not say a great
deal about it. Two contemporary philosophers who do are John McDowe119 and
Lawrence Blum. 10 They describe it as the ability to perceive certain "salient"
features of a particular situation. I think there are two possible ways of describing this "perception of salience." It might be a purely cognitive, normatively
neutral apprehension of a particular feature of a situation. In one of Blum's examples, the perception is that a woman standing on the subway is uncomfortable. 11 It is at least theoretically possible, I think, that one could perceive this
fact without feeling called upon to respond in any way, even if an appropriate
response, such as surrendering one's seat to her, were within one's power. On
the other hand, we might understand this perception as providing a reason for
action, though perhaps not an overriding one. Contrast the situation in which
Bob, seated on the subway, sees that a woman passenger who is standing is uncomfortable, but is not motivated to respond to her discomfort, with that of
Charles, who sees the woman's discomfort as a morally relevant fact that calls
for action. Charles may be unable to do anything practical in the situation: perhaps he is standing himself, or riding with a small child on his lap; but he "feels
the tug" of the morally salient fact in a way that Bob does not. Contrast both
Bob and Charles with Roger, who simply does not notice the woman's discomfort at all, though he is in the same perceptual situation as they.
Blum, I think, tends to understand the perception of salience in the normatively neutral way, whereas McDowell understands it in the normatively laden
one. For Aristotle, I think, the situation is complex. I believe he would say that
the cognitive component of perception is theoretically separable from the conative, but that in practice they are generally found together. It is the virtuous person who sees what is morally salient in most situations, and the virtuous person
sees the morally salient fact as a reason for action because he or she already is
predisposed by virtue to act appropriately. Still, it is possible for someone to
know, or at least be able to say, that a certain feature of a situation is morally
relevant and yet not be motivated to act on it: consider the morally weak person,
for example.
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Let us suppose, then, that the purely cognitive perception of morally salient
facts is theoretically separable, but perhaps only rarely psychologically separable, from motivation to action. Both the virtuous and the vicious or morally
weak person may be able to perceive the morally salient facts in a given situation, though only the virtuous person sees these facts as a reason for action. Still,
there is more involved in perception. For Aristotle, recall, moral perception was
like the visualization of a construction in a mathematical example. It is more
than a perception of a problem: it is the perception of a solution, indeed the best
solution, to the problem. As Blum notes, one may perceive a morally salient feature of a situation, and see this feature as one demanding some response, and yet
not know how to respond. To cite another of his examples: a cab driver passes
by a black mother and child to pick up a white male passenger. The passenger,
Tim, sees this as a racially based slight of the woman, and he is opposed to racism. But what is he to do? Blum notes: "Tim could be entirely and sincerely
committed to opposing racism and injustice (and for the right reasons), yet be a
poor judge of what doing this actually involves in this or other particular situations." 12
The sage is distinguished not only by his or her ability to perceive the morally salient features of various situations, but also by the ability to see what is to
be done to rectify the situation. Beyond this, the sage is distinguished by the fact
that this perception leads directly to right or good action. The sage is a moral
agent, not just a commentator on the actions of others. Philippa Foot captures
this fact in a passage from "Virtues and Vices," in which she quotes from a
novel by John Hersey:
Thus it seems right to attribute a kind of moral failing to some deeply discouraging and debilitating people who say, without lying, that they mean to be helpful; and on the other side to see virtue par excellence in one who is prompt and
resourceful in doing good. In his novel A Single Pebble John Hersey describes
such a man, speaking of a rescue in a swift flowing river: "It was the head
tracker's marvelous swift response that captured my admiration at first, his split
second solicitousness when he heard a cry of pain, his finding in mid-air, as it
were, the only way to save the injured boy. But there was more to it than that.
His action, which could not have been mulled over in his mind, showed a deep,
instinctive love of life, a compassion, an optimism, which made me feel very
good." 13

The relevant feature of the action described above is not only the fact that it
was lightning-quick, almost instinctive, but that it was the right action in the
context, "the only way" to save the injured boy. The tracker's action required
more than moral virtue; it required a set of physical skills that not all virtuous
agents might possess. But the ability to find the right course of action in a situation where moral goods are at stake is definitely a part of moral virtue; and it
does not seem unreasonable to describe it, in cases of this sort at least, as a matter of perception.
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How Is Perception Developed?
How is this complex ability first to discern morally salient features in particular
situations and second to find the correct course of action in those situations acquired?
There seem to be two possibilities: the first, that it is a mysterious natural
endowment that one either has or lacks; the second, that it is a skill that can be
developed. Aristotle favors the latter answer. If the former were the case, there
would not be any point in trying to develop moral education beyond what I have
called the "elementary school" stage of the inculcation of principles. Society
would consist of two kinds of people: those with insight and those without it.
The latter would have to defer to the former in all matters involving complex
decision-making. Plato at times seems to invoke this model when he speaks of
"the moral expert," as at Crito 47c-48a. Aristotle, in contrast, thinks that the capacity for virtue, and thus for happiness, is virtually universal among people of
normal psychological capacity (1.9, esp. 1099bl8-20).
Let us pursue the second possibility, since the first offers virtually no hope
for advanced moral education. If practical wisdom is a skill that can be acquired,
what is the process by which it is acquired? An Aristotelian answer would focus
on at least two aspects of moral education. The first is moral training. One develops the moral aspects of virtue, the parts that apply specifically to one's character, by practice. As Aristotle says in ll.2 and 4, we become virtuous by performing virtuous acts. Aristotle compares this moral habituation to the
development of artistic skill. His focus in these passages is on the training of
character rather than on the development of cognitive discernment. Still, we
might well think that, just as the artist's cognitive abilities are sharpened in the
course of practice, so might the moral agent's be. By performing repeated just
acts the agent might develop not only a disposition to be just but superior discernment of the nature of just actions themselves.

Experience
Moral discernment might be enhanced, however, by a second method as well, a
method that focuses on the cognitive aspects of moral wisdom. Perception, says
Aristotle, is shaped by experience.
While young men do indeed become good geometricians and mathematicians
and attain theoretical wisdom in such matters, they apparently do not attain
practical wisdom. The reason is that practical wisdom is concerned with particulars as well [as with universals), and knowledge of particulars comes from
experience. But a young man has no experience, for experience is the product
ofa long time. (VI.8, 1142a 12-16)

Experience, as Aristotle explains in Metaphysics I. I, is a certain kind of
knowledge of particulars:
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Now from memory experience is produced in men; for the several memoriesof
the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience. . . . [T]o
have a judgment that when Callias was ill of this disease this did him good, and
similarly in the case of Socrates and in many individual cases, is a matter of
experience.... With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to
art, and men of experience succeed even better than those who have theory
without experience. The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals,
art of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with the individual; for the physician does not cure man, except in an incidental way, but
Callias or Socrates or some other called by some such individual name, who
happens to be a man. If, then, a man has the theory without the experience, and
recognizes the universal but does not know the individual included in this, he
will often fail to cure; for it is the individual that is to be cured.... [M]en of
experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why. (980 b28-981 al;
a7-9; al2-28; W.D. Ross, trans.)

Not all experience is specifically moral, but experience in moral matters is what
gives the sage knowledge of what to do in particular cases. Now long life by itself does not suffice to give one experiential knowledge, but Aristotle clearly regards such knowledge as the exclusive possession of those who have lived a
long time. That is not to say, however, that it can only be acquired "first hand";
one can pick up a certain amount of experience, school oneself in moral judgment, by associating with those who already have this sort of wisdom: "[W]e
ought to pay as much attention to the sayings and opinions, undemonstrated as
they are, of wise and experienced older men as we do to demonstrated truths.
For experience has given such men an eye with which they can see correctly."
(VI.II, 1143b 11-14)
The implications for moral cultivation of the account just outlined seem
clear. The very best way to become a sage oneself would be to enter, when
young, into a relationship of discipleship with one who is already a sage. As I
mentioned at the outset of the paper, this may be what ancient schools of philosophy offered their students. (Of course, the prospective students faced difficulties in identifying wise teachers before they had become wise themselves;
such difficulties face everyone who seeks advanced moral education, both then
and now.) The sage might be able, ifhe or she were a philosopher, to transmit to
the student principles of moral conduct. More important, however, the sage
would be able to discuss both his or her own moral actions and the actions of the
student. By the discussion of particular cases, whether accompanied or not by
moral precept, the sage would instruct the disciple in the act of moral discernment. Much of this discussion, but by no means all, would be retrospective.
"What was it you saw in that situation," the disciple might ask, "that enabled
you to reach the decision you did?" And the sage would reply with an account of
the case that revealed its salient moral features. Moral education, on this account, is in part learning to see what the sage sees.
Even more important than the discussion of cases, however, might be the
moral actions of the sage. It is for these that the sage would acquire a reputation
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for ethical wisdom, and a following among the young. Sometimes, indeed, the
sage might be unable to explain exactly why a certain action seemed or did not
seem right. Still, the disciple might find observing the sage in action in these
cases to be morally edifying.
Suppose for a moment that the sage has no moral principles to transmit, no
teaching. Suppose further that he has, on occasion, nothing to say about particular actions that is helpful to the disciple. This was the condition of Socrates,
whose only explanation for refusal to act on some occasions was that his divine
sign forbade him. Still, a disciple of Socrates might benefit from associating
with him precisely by observing Socrates' actions. He would see Socrates acting
bravely in battle, resisting the seductive attractions of Alcibiades, refusing to
apprehend and turn over to the Thirty Leon of Salamis, refusing to try the generals en masse after the battle of Arginusae, refusing to leave Athens to escape the
death penalty. Most important, perhaps, he would see Socrates every day conducting philosophical inquiry as if it were the thing that mattered most in life.
Sometimes Socrates has a rational defense of his actions (as in the Crito); sometimes he has, or at least offers, none. One might debate concerning particular actions whether Socrates' choice was actually the wisest one possible. Still, the
many young people who followed Socrates must have been drawn to him by the
integrity of his actions, and indeed of his life. If they came to Socrates hoping
that he would transmit to them a set of moral principles, or a method of moral
reasoning that would enable them always to choose rightly (something of the
sort that at least some Sophists offered to provide) they would be disappointed;
for Socrates had no such set of principles or decision procedure to give. What he
had was his own example. For those relatives of Socrates' disciples who offered
to defend Socrates in court, the beneficial effect of his association with their
relatives must have been clear. Socrates improved the youth by exhibiting moral
virtue in action, not by precept.
The example of the sage is more important than his or her precepts. The
precepts might be wrong, or at any rate inaccurate, incomplete or misleading,
though the life of the sage is exemplary. Still, the association with the sage is
valuable. It is the sage's ability to make those precepts real in life, or at any rate
to find the right course of action, that may "rub off' on the disciple. If it were
not so, we would not be envious of those who had the opportunity to know the
great sages, such as Socrates and Jesus, or in our day Gandhi and Schweitzer, to
name just a few, at first hand. Each of these wrote down, or had disciples who
wrote down, the essential principles of their moral philosophies. If the experience of the example of the sage did not add something vital to the set of principles, we might be able, by the study of those principles, to attain the wisdom of
these four persons. It has been the argument of this paper that we cannot.
Socrates, I claimed above, is the clearest example in antiquity of the sage. I
suspect, though I cannot prove, that other philosophers who attracted students to
their schools did so at least as much by example as by precept. (Consider in this
context the remark of Aristotle in E.N. X.2 about Eudoxus, who made hedonism
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seem philosophically respectable because he was himself an admirable human
being. I think this point was recognized by Plato, and was one reason for his
writing in the way he did.) 14 If Plato recognized that the influence of Socrates on
him was not just a matter of Socrates' moral doctrines (for Socrates claimed to
have none), but of his moral example, that would explain why Plato attempts in
his dialogues not just to present Socrates' moral reasoning but to present the
person of Socrates himself. Many young people come to philosophy through
Plato's dialogues. They become students of philosophy not just because they
share a set of views with Socrates or Plato, but because they are inspired by the
life and actions of Socrates. (For the same reason many readers of the Gospels
become Christians.) If the argument I have been making so far is correct, this
personal attachment is far from irrelevant to one's moral development. In a discussion of the Symposium my friend Giovanni Ferrari criticizes Alcibiades for
his erotic attachment to Socrates: "Instead of falling in love with wisdom," he
writes, "he falls in love with the wisdom-lover." 15 If Alcibiades' love for Socrates is based, as I believe it is, on the moral quality of Socrates' life, such love is
anything but a mistake. It is an invaluable aspect of moral development.
What are we to do if we do not have access to a sage? One answer would be
to study the sage at second-hand, through the writings, for instance, of Plato. Related to this would be what I shall call the "moral" study of literature. Most
moral philosophy, I have claimed, gives us abstract principles. Though it may
apply these principles to examples, the examples usually abstract from the character of the agents who figure in them. We hear about Smith and Brown, or Jim
and Pedro, but the framer of the example does little or nothing to help us understand their particular motivations and character. In literature, on the other hand,
the representation of character is a major part of the writer's task. We get to see
how a certain sort of person, whom we get to know well over the course of the
work, would respond to various serious challenges of the sort we meet in life.
Here examples of error and failure can be as instructive as examples of correct
decision and success.
Such study of literature, which views the characters of a novel, story or play
as if they were real people, is out of fashion at present. Part of the reason for this
unpopularity is the failure to distinguish the moral study of literature from what
I shall call the "moralistic" study of literature: the kind of approach that attempts
to reduce the moral "point" of a work of art to a single "lesson" that can be formulated in words, perhaps even as an abstract moral principle. This reduction of
great art to a sampler formula is of course objectionable, and ought to be discouraged; but it is exactly the opposite of what I am recommending. I am seeking instead a complex appreciation of the characters of works of narrative art,
one that brings out the many features that enter into the decisions made by the
characters. This form of discussion may violate a canon of literary study by
treating the characters as if they were real people, rather than according to the
canons of one aesthetic approach or another; but it is not simplistic in its aim.
A second aid to moral development along the same lines would be the
moral study of history and biography. Here the problem of treating characters as
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real people does not arise, because it is real people we are concerned with. Here
again I must distinguish what I have in mind from the kind of sanitized presentation of historical figures of history and literature that used to be (and for all I
know may still be) offered in schools. What I have in mind, rather, is the detailed and complex study of individual lives, seen in historical context, that was
offered in the ancient world, for example, by Thucydides and Plutarch. The portraits offered by these authors of such people as Pericles, Nicias and Alcibiades
were of course influenced by the authors' conception of the nature of their project. The historian undoubtedly has a view, which the moral philosopher may
not accept, of the power of individual decisions to influence historical events.
Even if the moral philosopher does not share all the presuppositions of the historian, however, there is much to be learned from the historian's presentation of
his or her understanding of the character and actions of a given historical individual. One of the ways in which the study of such works could be valuable is in
making the younger reader, who is thinking, perhaps of embarking on a career
that follows in the footsteps of that of Socrates or Nicias, of the possible costs of
such a career. One might be inclined to see only the attractions; the historian
points out the pitfalls as well. This has application to the question of moral
character, with which we are concerned. Integrity is undoubtedly a virtue, but
one who undertakes to be a person of integrity should be aware that his fellow
citizens may require him to take poison. Piety is also a virtue, but one who sets
out on the religious life must realize that the military campaign one undertakes
as a general may come to grief as a result of it. (This is not to discourage
development of these virtues, or any others, but only to make the point that the
world is not made in such a way as to ensure that virtue is always appropriately
rewarded.)

Practical Conclusion
I conclude with a practical observation. If what I have argued so far is correctthat is, if the best way to provide advanced moral education is by the close association of a disciple or group of disciples with a person who exemplifies practical wisdom-the university that intends to be an instrument of moral education
should aim at the creation and sustaining of these relationships. It should hire
faculty who are morally experienced and as morally wise as possible and put
them in close contact with the students who are admitted to the university, so
that these students have the opportunity to learn from the moral decision-making
of their elders. It should further encourage these faculty members, and indeed all
of its faculty, to act as mentors to students who present themselves for moral
education.
Faculty should not eschew, as many now do in the name of protecting the
moral freedom of youth, or diffidence, or for some other reason, the task of
moral education. We need not be sages; it is sufficient that we are somewhat fur-
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ther down the road of moral experience than the students we seek to educate (as
Protagoras claims, and to my mind truthfully claims to be in Plato's Protagoras,
at 328a-b). We need not actively seek the role of mentor; if we cultivate our own
moral wisdom, students will seek us out. All that is necessary is that we accept
the role of moral educator when it is imposed on us, in the realization that the
moral wisdom of young people can be developed in no other way than by our
example.
If this understanding of the nature of moral education, or the part of it that
goes beyond what I earlier called the "elementary school" phase in which people
learn basic moral principles, were accepted by universities, and if those universities who accept the moral education of the young as a goal were to institutionalize the practices implied by that understanding, I think the modem university
would be changed almost beyond recognition. The change, however, would not
be one that brought about something that never existed before; it would, rather,
be one that restored something that existed in the philosophical schools of antiquity and, to a lesser extent, in the colleges and universities of Western Europe
and the United States until fairly recently. So my practical proposal is for a return to the practices of the past, but of course with the proviso that they must be
adapted to the circumstances of the present. That would be enough, I think, to
keep us busy for some time.
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